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PROPERTY EXEMPT FROM FLORIDA TAXATION
ALBER' IB. BIRNSTEIN0
It is proposed in this article to discuss the property which
is exempt from taxation under the Constitution, statutes
and decisions of the State of Florida. Among the topics
treated will be exemptions of property of educational
institutions, charitable institutions, fraternal and bene-
volent institutions and churches, the exemption of public
property, the homestead tax exemption, and various mis-
cellaneous exemptions.
The Law of Taxation is constantly changing and there
have been numerous amendments of the Florida tax
laws in the past few years. In the field of state taxation
as in the field of federal taxation, there are apt to be
many conflicting and confusing decisions. This is not
a reflection upon the courts but is brought about by a
number of factors, including changes in economic condi-
tions, changes in political philosophies, the ingenuity of
clever persons planning devices for the evasion of taxation,
and, in state taxation, the fact that tax legislation is
frequently prepared by persons without the proper train-
ing, knowledge or experience.
The Florida Constitution provides that the Legislature
shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just
valuation of property, both real and personal, excepting
such property as may be exempted by law for municipal,
educational, literary, scientific, religious or charitable
purposes,' and that the property of all corporations, ex-
cept the property of a corporation which shall construct
a ship or barge canal across the peninsula of Florida, if
the Legislature should so enact, shall be §ubject to taxation
unless such property be held and used exclusively fbr
* Member of the Florida and Georgia Bar; A.B., University of Geor-
gia, 1919; LL.B., Columbia University, 1922; Lecturer in Taxation,
University of Miami.
Art. 9, Sec. 1, Fla. Constitution.
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religious, scientific, municipal, educational, literary or
charitable purposes.' The Florida Statutes provide that
all real and personal property in this state, and all
personal property belonging to persons residing in this
State, shall be subject to taxation in the manner pro-
vided by law, unless expressly exempted from taxation.'
From the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions
it would appear, first, that all property in Florida is sub-
ject to taxation unless it is expressly exempted by law, and,
second, that all property of corporations shall be subject
to taxation unless such property shall be held and used
exclusively for religious, scientific, municipal, educational,
literary or charitable purposes.
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
The laws of Florida expressly exempt such property
of educational, literary, benevolent, fraternal, charitable
and scientific institutions within the State as is actually
occupied and used by them for the purposes for which
they have been organized, provided not more than seventy-
five per cent of the floor spade of the property is rented,
and the rents, issues and profits are used for the educa-
tional, literary, benevolent, fraternal or charitable pur-
poses of the institutions.' The proviso clause was added
to the law by Chapter 18312, Laws of 1937, except that
this chapter used the language "fifty per cent" instead of
"seventy-five per cent", and Chapter 19376, Acts of 1939,
changed the percentage to seventy-five per cent. In the
case of Rast v. Hulvey, an individual used certain land
and buildings for a school known as Florida Military
Academy but also used the property for his home, and it
was held that the property was not exempt. It is entirely
possible that in this case of Rast v. Hulvey, supra, if it had
been made to appear that it was necessary for the owner
of the school to live on the premises in order to preserve
the property and to conduct the school, then the exemption
2 Art. 16, Sec. 16, Fla. Constitution.
Sec. 192.01 Fa. Stat. 1941.




might have been granted. In the case of Lummus v. Florida
Adirondack School, a corporation organized solely to
conduct a school owned property in Florida which it used
for preparatory school purposes during the months of
January, February and March, and the corporation charged
tuition. The Supreme Court held that the property of
the corporation was exempt. -This case was followed in the
case of Lummus v. Miami Military Academy.'
In the case of University Club v. Lanier,' it appeared
that the University Club was a corporation not organized
for profit, that the Club maintained a small library and
dining-room, that the Club was open and run not only for
members but also for other social organizations, that the
Club provided meals for its members at a charge, that
the dining-room was on a self-sustaining basis, and that
the Club proposed to give scholarships to the State Uni-
versity and had given one scholarship. It was held that
the property was not exempt from taxation because it was
not used exclusively for educational or literary purposes.
There seems to be no difficulty with these reported cases
dealing With exemptions of educational institutions. In
the cases where the exemptions were granted the property
was held and used solely and exclusively for educational
purposes.
In the case of Riverside Military Academy, Inc. v.
Watkins,' there was presented the following state of facts:
The property of the Military Academy had been used
exclusively for educational purposes and was therefore
tax exempt, and thereafter the Government instituted
condemnation proceedings by which it acquired the right
to occupy the Academy property until after the termina-
tion of World War II. It was held that the property was
not subject to taxation since the exemption of govern-
mental property from taxation applied upon the Academy's
loss of the use of the property. This is a very close case,
since the title was vested in the Military Academy, an
* 168 So. 232.
168 So. 241.
* 161 So. 78.
19 So. (2d) 870.
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educational institution, but was not being used by it for
educational purposes, and therefore the educational ex-
emption would probably not apply. While the property
was occupied by the United States Government, it was
not property of the United States as required by the
exemption law.'0 The decision was perhaps justified on
the ground of public policy during times of war.
CHARITABLE, FRATERNAL AND BENEVOLENT INSTITUTIONS
The courts have had considerable difficulty in determin-
ing when the property of certain charitable institutions
and lodges are exempt from taxation. The constitutional
provisions discussed above speak of exemptions for educa-
tional, literary, scientific, religious or charitable purposes,"
and not for lodge, fraternal or benevolent purposes. The
statute dealing with the exemption of the property of
charitable, fraternal and benevolent institutions is the
same as that which sets forth the exemption of the prop-
erty of educational institutions," and provides for the
exemption of the property of benevolent, fraternal and
charitable institutions, although the Constitution appar-
ently calls for no exemption of the property of such
benevolent and fraternal institutions. This same section
of the Statutes, as now amended, allows the exemption
of property of these institutions, whether incorporated or
not, provided not more than seventy-five per cent of the
floor space is rented. In the case of corporations, this
seems to be contrary to the provision of the Constitution
stating that the property of all corporations shall be sub-
ject to taxation unless such property be held and used
exclusively for religious, scientific, municipal, educational,
literary or charitable purposes."
I In view of the apparent conflict between the Constitu-
tion and the Statutes, there is little wonder that the
courts have had trouble in. deciding certain cases, particu-
larly after the adoption of said Chapter 19376, Acts of
00 See. 192.06(1), Fla. Stat. 1941.
00 Art. 9, Sec. 1, Fla. Constitution, and Art. 16, See. 16, Fla. Con-
stitution.
Sec. 902.06(3), Fla. Stat. 1941.
Art. 16, See. 16, Fla. Constitution.
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1939, which permitted certain institutions to rent seventy-
five per cent of the floor space of their property and still
claim a tax exemption. In the case of State ex rel Miller
v. Doss," it appeared that Lake County Medical Center,
Inc., a non-profit corporation, owned a four story building,
the three upper floors being used exclusively for charit-
able purposes and the first floor containing places of
business rented to private persons. The rents paid were
used exclusively to operate a hospital. The Supreme Court
of Florida held that this property was subject to taxation
under the applicable constitutional provisions.- This case
involved taxes for the year 1938 and subsequent years.
The court in its opinion did not refer to the aforementioned
1.939 law which permitted the renting of seventy-five per
cent of the floor space without forfeiting the exemption,
but it did refer to Chapter 18312, Laws of 1937, which
permitted the renting of fifty per cent of the floor space
without forfeiting the exemption. The court came to the
conclusion that, since the Florida Constitution provided
that no property of a corporation should be exempt unless
it was used, exclusively for certain purposes, a statute
which permitted an exemption when a portion of the prop-
erty was used for different purposes, was unconstitutional.
We agree with this conclusion since the statute should not
be allowed to enlarge the constitutional provision.
In the case of State ex rel Cragor Co. v. Doss," title to
certain property belonged to the Trustees of Leesburg
Lodge No. 58, I.O.O.F., and the Trustees for Herman Lodge
No. 27, Knights of Pythias, neither of said lodges being
incorporated. The upper floor was used for lodge pur-
poses and the ground floor was rented for commercial
purposes, but not more than seventy-five per cent of the
floor space was rented and the rents were used for bene-
volent or charitable purposes. The Supreme Court of
Florida held this property to be exempt. It is to be noted
that this case does not deal with the property of corpora-
tions, and that consequently no exclusive use is required
2 So. (2d) 303.
" Art. 16, Sec. 16, Fla. Constitution,
8 So. (2d) 15.
[ Vol. I
1]llllIt LAIV QUARTERLY
by the Florida Constitution. However, the Constitution,
in speaking of tax exemptions, does not mention the prop-
erty of benevolent or fraternal institutions or the property
of lodges," and, under a strict construction of the consti-
tutional prbvisions, it would appear that the property of
fraternal or benevolent institutions and the property of
lodges should not be exempt from taxation.
There was a second case under the same style of State
ex rel Cragor Co. v. Doss," which was a case similar to
the first case of State ex rel Cragor Co. v. Doss, supra,
the main difference being that the property involved in
the second case belonged to the Woman's Club of Lees-
burg and Lodge No. 58, F. and A. M., both corporations.
The property of the Woman's Club was a two story build-
ing, and that of the Lodge was a three story building.
The Woman's Club property was rented not exceeding
five times per year at a charge which was sufficient to
pay lights, janitor's fees and repairs, and two small rooms
on the ground floor constituting about one-sixth of the
floor space was rented to the Works Progress Administra-
tion, for which a monthly compensation was paid, the
balance of the ground floor being used to house the Lees-
burg Public Library for which no rent was paid. The Lodge
property consisted of three floors of equal area, the first
floor being used for business purposes, the second floor
for business and professional offices, and the third floor
for lodge rooms, all revenues collected from rents being
used to retire indebtedness on the property. The lower
court held that five-sixths of the Woman's Club property
should be exempt from taxation and one-sixth thereof
should be taxed, that one-third of the value of the Lodge
property should be exempt and two-thirds of it should be
taxed. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court and
said that Art. 16, Sec. 16, Fla. Constitution, was designed
to cover the property of certain corporations for profit
which had been enjoying exemptions, and had no refer-
ence to Woman's Clubs and Masonic Lodges like those in-
volved in this case. The Supreme Court concluded its
" Art. 9, Sec. 1, Fla. Constitution.
" 8 So. (2d) 17.
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opinion by stating that if the taxes on the taxable portion
of the property were not paid and a sale for nonpayment
of taxes should become necessary, the entire property
might have to be sold. We feel that this case could well
have been decided differently, first because the limited
constitutional exemption should not be enlarged by statute,
and, second, because under the Florida theory of in rem
taxation, a fractional portion of real estate should not
be taxed.
Apparently litigants were still not yet satisfied that the
law had been settled with reference to the exemption of
property owned by an incorporated lodge or fraternal in-
stitution where a portion of the property was rented to
outsiders, and the matter again came up in the case of
Rogers v. City of Leesburg," where the City of Leesburg
undertook to tax the property of Leesburg Lodge No. 58,
Free and Accepted Masons, a corporation. The building
in question was three stories high, each floor being of
the same proportions, the first and second floors being
rented for professional and commercial purposes, and the
third floor being used for lodge purposes, so that less
than seventy-five per cent of the total floor space was
rented. It further appeared that the rents were used to
retire the indebtedness against the property and for the
fraternal purposes of the Lodge. One side claimed that
the case was governed by State ex rel Miller v. Doss,
supra, while the other side relied upon the first case of
State ex rel Cragor Co. v. Doss, supra. In a four to three
decision a majority of the court held that the first Cragor
case governed the situation and that the property was
exempt from taxation. In a dissenting opinion Mr.
Justice Adams stated that the first case of State ex rel
Cragor Co. v. Doss, supra, was not applicable because
the claimant was not a corporation in that case while
the claimant was a corporation in the Rogers case. The
second case of State ex rel Cragor Co. v. Doss, supra, was
not even mentioned in the Rogers case. Apparently the
Supreme Court has now decided that, whether the owner
27 So. (26) 70.
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of property is a corporation or is not a corporation, if
twenty-five per cent or more of the property is used for
educational, literary, benevolent, fraternal or charitable
purposes, if not more than seventy-five per cent of the
floor space is rented, and if the rents, issues and profits
are used for educational, literary, benevolent, fraternal or
charitable purposes of said institutions, the entire property
is exempt. While many cases have held that exemptions
from taxation should be strictly construed, the Supreme
Court has been liberal in allowing exemptions to charit-
able institutions and to lodges and fraternal institutions.
At least the law now seems to be well settled on this point.
An interesting case is that of Miami Battle Creek v.
Lummus.'0 Here it appeared that Miami Battle Creek, a
corporation, was organized as a corporation not for profit,
that its president was Dr. John H. Kellogg, a well known
physician, and that it operated a hospital in Dade County,
Florida. The hospital charged many patients regular rates,
and paid reasonable salaries to its officers, but nurses
were trained and public lectures were given at the hos-
pital and its funds were used for educational and charit-
able purposes. The hospital property was held exempt
from taxation. In this case the court emphasized the
nature of the corporation rather than the use to which
the property was put. This decision can be justified on
the theory that, since the corporation was incorporated
as a non-profit corporation and actually operated as a
charitable, scientific and educational corporation, its prop-
erty must necessarily have been used for charitable,
scientific and educational purposes even though most
patients paid for the use of hospital rooms.
CHURCH PROPERTY
Under the applicable statute there is exempt from taxa-
tion all houses of public worship and lots on which they
are situated, and all furniture therein, but it is provided
that any building, being a house of worship which shall be
rented for any purposes except for schools or places of
worship, shall be taxed the same as other property.oa In
"' 192 So. 211.
""a Sec. 192.06(4), Fla. Stat. 1941.
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Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co. v. City of Wild-
wood, " an insurance company owned property that it
leased to a church, which used it for religious purposes,
but it was held that the property was not exempt since it
was not "held and used exclusively for religious purposes. ''
In Lummus v. Miami Beach Congregational Church,2
certain property was conveyed to the church with the re-
striction that it should be used for church purposes only.
For six years assistant pastors of the organization lived
on the property without payment of rent, serving as care-
takers. The land was originally purchased as a site for
a church, but these plans did not materialize on account
of the financial depression. In 1934 all of the buildings
were razed. Subsequently the land was used for meetings
of clubs, committees and social gatherings of the church
and a Boy Scout troop sponsored by it. Apparently this
property would not have been exempt under said statutory
provisions because there was no church building and the
property was not used exclusively for schools or places
of worship. However, the Supreme Court of Florida held
the property exempt under Art. 16, Sec. 16, of the Florida
Constitution because the property was held exclusively
for religious purposes, particularly in view of the restric-
tion in the deed. In so holding the Supreme Court stated
that said constitutional provision was self-executing and
did not need a legislative enactment to make it effective.
We feel that there is a great deal of doubt as to the sound-
ness of this decision. It will be remembered that in the
case of incorporated lodges, the court, on the basis of a
statute, held property to be exempt, although the Constitu-
tion seemed to provide to the contrary. However, in the
case of churches, the statute requires that property of a
church must be used for schools or places of worship in
order to be exempt, and the court in this instance entirely
disregarded the statute. Here again the Supreme Court
has been extremely liberal in allowing an exemption.
PUBLIC PROPERTY
It will be noted that the statute provides for the exemp-
tion from taxation of all property of the United States
" 160 So. 208.
22 195 So. 607.
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and the State of Florida, except such property of the
United States as shall be taxable by the State or any sub-
division or municipality thereof under any law of the
United States, and also all public property of the counties,
cities, and school districts used or intended for public
purposes." Ordinarily lands belonging- to the State of
Florida or to the United States are not subject to taxation.
Suppose the state or the United States should enter into a
contract to sell property to an individual, would the prop-
erty be subject to taxation before a deed was issued?
In the case of Mundee v. Freeman," it was held that when
the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund of Florida
had sold property to an individual, and the individual had
made entry and had paid the purchase price, but no deed
had been given, the property was subject to taxation. In
the case of Bancroft Inv. Corporation v. City of Jackson-
ville," it appeared that certain property was owned by
the United States, that a contract of sale was made to a
private purchaser, that a down payment was made and
the purchaser let into possession, that the property had
been used for private purposes, but that a balance re-
mained unpaid on the purchase price. The Supreme Court
of Florida, by a divided court, held that the property was
subject to taxation. This conclusion was no doubt in-
fluenced by a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
the United States."
As heretofore seen, the statute exempts from taxation
property belonging to the State of Florida and to counties,
cities, and school districts. Therefore, if the title to a
street should be owned by the state or county or city, the
street would be exempt from taxation. However, in many
cases in Florida the fee simple title to property used as a
street does not belong to the state or county or city, but
title thereto is vested in an individual who has dedicated
28 Sec. 192.06(1)&(2), Fla. Stat. 1941.
22 3 So. 153.
27 So. (2d) 162.
'6 S. R. A. Inc. v. State of Minnesota, 326 U.S. -- , 66 Sup. Ct. 749;
pending Bill H. R. 10 before United States House of Representatives
permits state, county or municipality to tax government property which
is tinder contract of sale to private individual.
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the use of the street to the public. In such cases the mem-
bers of the public have only an easement or right to use
the street. The Florida Statutes do not specifically exempt
a public street which is owned by an individual even though
it has been dedicated to the public for street purposes.
However, it seems to be the general law that even in the
absence of statute a public street is not subject to taxa-
tion." The Supreme Court of Florida has held, in the case
of Wolfson v. Heins," that private streets, which are owned
by private individuals and not dedicated to the public, are
subject to taxation. In Marvin v. Housing Authority of
Jacksonville," it was held that the real and personal prop-
erty of the Housing Authority of Jacksonville, organized
under an act creating housing authorities to undertake
slum clearance, is exempt from all ad valorem taxes.
HOMESTEAD TAX EXEMPTION
Every person who has the legal or equitable title to real
property in Florida and who resides thereon and in good
faith makes the same his or her permanent home or the
permanent home of another or others legally or naturally
dependent upon said person, is entitled to an exemption
from all taxation, except for the assessment of special
benefits, up to the assessed valuation of Five Thousand
Dollars on one home and contiguous real property, as
defined in Art. 10, Sec. 1, of the Florida Constitution for
the year 1939 and thereafter. The title may be held by
the entireties, jointly or in common with others, and the
exemption may be apportioned among such of the owners
as reside thereon in accordance with thei- respective in-
terests, but no exemption of more than Five Thousand
Dollars may be allowed to any person or any one dwelling
house, nor may the amount of the exemption allowed any
person exceed the proportionate assessed valuation based
on the interest owned by such persons. These provisions
appear in an amendment to the Florida Constitution
adopted in 1938 and in the Statutes." The homestead tax
Cooley on Taxation (4th Ed.), Sec. 638, at page 1336; Collector of
Taxes v. Boston, 180 N.E. 116, 81 A.L.R. 1515.
6 So. (2d) 858.
" 183 So. 145.
Art. 10, Sec. 7, Fla. Constitution; See, 192.12, F.S.A. 1941,
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amendment was first adopted in 1934, but the 1938 amend-
ment was considerably broader and more liberal than the
earlier one.
Vendees in possession of real estate under bona fide
contracts to purchase, when such instruments are recorded,
and who reside thereon in good faith and make the same
their permanent home, and widows residing on real estate
by virtue of dower or other estates therein limited in time
by deed, will, jointure, or settlement are deemed to have
legal or beneficial title to the property for homestead
tax exemption purposes." The words "resident", "resi-
dence", "permanent residence", "permanent home" and
those of like import, are not to be construed so as to re-
quire continuous physical residence on the property, but
mean only that place which the person claiming the ex-
emption may rightfully and in good faith call his home
to the exclusion of all other places where he may from
time to time temporarily reside."
In the case of Steuart v. State ex rel Dolcimascolo," it
was held that an alien head of a family residing on a home-
stead in Florida was not entitled to the constitutional
homestead tax exemption because he was not a citizen
of Florida. This decision was handed down in 1935 and
was based upon the amendment adopted in 1934. Under
the 1934 amendment, in order to be entitled to the home-
stead. tax exemption, one must have been a citizen of
Florida residing in Florida and must have been a head of
a family. Under the present provision citizenship is no
longer required, nor is it necessary that one be a head of
a family.. Under the existing law, a single man who is a
subject of some other country and who has only a con-
tract to purchase property and who spends his summers
away from Florida may be entitled to a homestead tax
exemption if he in good faith calls the Florida property
his home to the exclusion of all others.
When the amendment to the Constitution granting the
homestead tax exemption was first adopted there were
many bonds outstanding which had been issued by munici-
1 Sec. 192.13, Fla. Stat. 1941.




palities, counties or other taxing districts. The full taxing
power of the municipality, county or taxing district was
pledged as security for the payment of these bonds. In a
number of cases the question arose as to whether home-
steads were taxable for debt service as to bonded indebted-
ness existing at the time of the adoption of the amend-
ment. The Supreme Court of Florida held that home-
steads were taxable for such debt service on bonded in-
debtedness," and also that where original municipal bonds
were issued prior to the adoption of the homestead tax
exemption amendment, homesteads were liable for a tax
to service bonds issued for the purpose of refunding such
original bonds of the city."
MISCELLANEOUS EXEMPTIONS
The Constitution and Statutes of Florida provide for
many different types of exemptions in addition to those
already discussed. Included in the property so exempt are
burying grounds not owned or held by individuals for
speculative purposes, and tombs and rights of burial;"
public libraries and certain property belonging to and con-
nected with public libraries;" certain property belonging
to agricultural societies;'" certain property owned by reg-
ularly constituted women's clubs of Florida, or the Ameri-
can Legion, or certain college fraternities or sororities;"
certain homes, clubhouses, hospitals and other property
owned and operated by certain organizations of ex service-
men;' certain property of Young Men's Christian As-
sociations;'' the real and personal property of public
utilities owned, operated or controlled by a city but being
in a county other than the county in which the city is
located;'" and certain property of industrial plants en-
" Yowell v. Rogers, 175 So. 772: City of Coral Gables v. State, 176
So. 40.
" Richard v. City of Fort Lauderdale, I So. (2d) 202.
Sec. 192.06(4), Fla. Stat. 1941.
s See. 192.06(5), Fla. Stat. 1941.
SSec. 192.06(6), Fla. Stat. 1941.
Sec. 192.06(8), Fla. Stat. 1941.
Sec. 192.06(9), Fla. Stat. 1941.
Sec. 192.09, Fla. Stat. 1941.
Sec. 192.52, Fla. Stat. 1941.
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gaged in the manufacture of particular articles, which
last-mentioned exemption is for a limited, period of time
and is not effective after the end of the year 1948." There
are also a number of limited exemptions which relieve
from taxation property to the value of five hundred dol-
lars, among these being property to the value of five
hundred dollars belonging to every widow and to every
person who is a bona fide resident of Florida who has
lost a limb or been disabled in war or by misfortune ;" and
household goods and personal effects to the value of five
hundred dollars belonging to the head of a family residing
in Florida.' There is also a law to the effect that real
estate of every religious or charitable institution in Flor-
ida engaged in the support, maintenance and care of
orphans and dependent children, shall be exempt from ad
valorem taxes in a sum equal to five hundred dollars for
each child cared for in such institution." The apparent
purpose of this last-mentioned provision is to exempt cer-
tain property of orphan homes which would not be exempt
under other statutory and constitutional provisions.
CONCLUSION
From the above discussion it is seen that the Legislature
of Florida has been very liberal in allowing tax exemp-
tions, and that the Supreme Court of Florida has been
extremely liberal in construing the tax exemption laws.
Each new Legislature adds to the tax machinery and in
some instances the new parts added do not fit well and
hinder rather than assist the orderly functioning of the
machinery. Perhaps this situation could be remedied
somewhat if the Legislature would enact a law providing
for the appointment of a Tax Commission, or a Tax
Board, or a Tax Council charged with the duty of making
a study of the tax structure of the state, and of all pro-
posed tax legislation. This Commission should be com-
posed of attorneys experienced in the tax field and could
11 Art. 9, Sec. 12, Fla. Constitution; City of Jacksonville v. Continental
Can Co., 151 So. 488.
" Art. 9, See. 9, Fla. Constitution: See. 192.06(7), Fla. Stat. 1941;
Sec. 192.11, Fla. Stat. 1941.
" Art. 9, Sec. 11, Fla. Constitution.
Sec. 192.07, Fla. Stat. 1941.
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possibly work under the supervision of the Comptroller.
The Commission could suggest the adoption of needed tax
laws. All proposed legislative bills covering the field of
taxation should be submitted to the Commission, which
could make recommendations and re-draft the bills so that
they will fit into the general tax scheme.
